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Religious Officials as Marital Counselors
in Court-Connected Conciliation:
Are there First Amendment Concerns?
After World War II divorce rates increased at what many
considered an alarming rate.1  Searching for a means to reduce the
number of divorces, or to provide aid for families in distress, legislatures
began to experiment with divorce reform. Major reforms included
changing the grounds for divorce2 and establishing family courts and
conciliation courts. Legislatures hoped that by providing alternatives to
litigation, they could encourage reconciliation. States such as Utah, New
York, and California adopted counseling programs for families in
trouble,3 programs which could often be consulted where no court action
was pending.4 Legislators and policymakers may have had an altruistic
desire to reconcile spouses, but saving money ranked as one of the top
reasons for enacting the statutes. Some legislators and taxpayers believed
that fewer divorces would mean fewer women and children on the welfare
rolls.' Ultimately, although many couples used the services, the marital
counseling programs remained controversial, were too cumbersome to
operate, and did not result in the significant cost savings anticipated.'
Despite the perceived failure of the marriage counseling
1. In 1897, the number of divorces per 100 marriages was estimated to be 2.8, in 1930,
17.4, and in 1950, 23.1. Max Rheinstein, The Law of Divorce and the Problem of Marriage
Stability, 9 VAND. L. REv. 633, 634 (1955-56). See also Brigitte M. Bodenheimer, The
Utah Marriage Counseling Experiment: An Account of Changes in Divorce Law and
Procedure, 7 UTAH L. REv. 443 (1960-61); Jon M.A. McLaughlin, Court-Connected
Marriage Counseling and Divorce - The New York Experience, 11 J. FAM. L. 517 (1978-79);
David E. Seidelson, Systematic Marriage Investigation and Counseling in Divorce Cases:
Some Reflections on its Constitutional Propriety and General Desirability, 36 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 60 (1967-68).
2. One of the broadest reforms made to divorce law was the introduction of no fault
divorce statutes. By 1982, only two states, South Dakota and Illinois, had fault based
divorce statutes. Morris H. Wolff, Family Conciliation: Draft Rules for the Settlement of
Family Disputes, 21 J. FAM. L. 213, 223 n.52 (1982-83). See also, Henry H. Foster, Jr. &
Doris Jonas Freed, Divorce in the Fifty States: An Overview, 14 FAM. L. Q. 229 (1980).
3. For an overview of some of the programs, see Henry H. Foster, Jr., Conciliation and
Counseling in the Courts in Family Law Cases, 41 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 353 (1966).
4. Bodenheimer, supra note 1, at 445-46. See also Neil R. Sabin, The Family Court
Act, 1970 UTAH L. REv. 106.
5. Bodenheimer, supra note 1, at 469. Seidelson, supra note 1, at 63 n.7.
6. See Foster, supra note 3; Dorothy Linder Maddi, The Effect of Conciliation Court
Proceedings on Petitions for the Dissolution of Marriage, 13 J. FAM. L. 495 (1973-74);
Wolff, supra note 2. The clash in style between the legal system and the counselors'
conciliation styles also created a significant functional problem. Bodenheimer, supra note 1,
at 466.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 8:2 1993]
experiments, policymakers liked conciliation procedures. Some states
repealed the separate marriage counseling infrastructure provisions,7 but
maintained the conciliation provisions.8  Other states enacted new
conciliation statutes.9 These statutes established conciliation courts that
the legislators believed would assist in preserving family life and
protecting the welfare of children."0 The statutes provided for referral of
the parties by the court to a marriage counselor." In many cases, the
counseling or referral provisions of the statutes included a list of suggested
counselors, and the list often included a religious official, such as a
priest.' By specifically allowing referral to a religious official, the
legislatures may have violated of the First Amendment religion clauses.'
Conciliation statutes played an integral part in divorce reform, and religion
can be a strong presence in family life. Determining whether conciliation
statutes that provide for court referral to a religious official violate the
First Amendment is thus an important question. Further, as alternative
dispute resolution (ADR) methods are given increasing play by courts and
legislatures, examining potential pitfalls will prevent future problems with
other ADR statutes.' 4 This Comment will examine the basic framework
of the conciliation statutes, apply the basic First Amendment analysis to
the "religious official" provisions of those statutes, and suggest an answer
to the questions about their constitutionality.
7. Utah in 1961, New York in 1973.
8. Even Utah re-enacted portions of its marriage counseling act, primarily those sections
concerned with conciliation procedures. See Sabin, supra note 4.
9. These states included Arizona, Iowa, Michigan, Montana, Nebraska, Ohio, and
Washington.
10. See infra note 44 and Part ll.A.I.
11. See infra notes 22, 23.
12. See infra notes 22, 23.
13. The Illinois Supreme Court has struck down portions of that state's divorce and
family court acts on constitutional grounds. In People ex rel Bernat v. Bicke, 91 N.E.2d 588
(1950), the Illinois Supreme Court struck down counseling provisions similar to those
discussed in this Comment. The court based that portion of its decision on McCollum v.
Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948). McCollum struck down a program which allowed
public school students to be released from class to participate in religious instruction.
Bernat, 91 N.E.2d at 595. No other state court has acted similarly, possibly because few
individuals have challenged the provisions.
14. Other constitutional challenges to ADR statutes have included challenges based on
the Fourteenth Amendment (due process and equal protection grounds); the Seventh
Amendment (ury trial right); separation of powers; and federalism concerns. Dwight
Golann, Making Alternative Dispute Resolution Mandatory: The Constitutional Issues, 68
OR. L. REv. 487 (1989).
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I. THE CONCILIATION STATUTES
In states that have enacted conciliation court statutes, the basic
framework and procedure is similar.' A conciliation or family court act
provides for the formation of a conciliation court, generally operating as
an arm of the district court. 6  The court is given jurisdiction
"[w]henever any controversy exists between spouses which may... result
in the dissolution.., of the marriage... and there is any minor child of
the spouses . . . whose welfare might be affected thereby .... ." Some
states also allow jurisdiction where there is no minor child, if it "appears
to the court that reconciliation of the spouses or amicable adjustment of the
controversy can probably be achieved, and that the work of the court in
cases involving children will not be seriously impeded by the acceptance of
the case."" Thus, where there is a minor child of the parties, a
controversy "shall" be under the jurisdiction of the court (i.e., there is no
discretion). Where there is no minor child, the judge exercises discretion
and can grant or deny jurisdiction, subject to any other statutory
limitations.
A spouse who wishes to take advantage of the conciliation court
"may file . . . a petition for conciliation, to preserve the marriage by
effecting a reconciliation, or to amicably settle the controversy between the
spouses, so as to avoid further litigation over the issues involved. "19 The
filing of a petition for conciliation stays any previously filed actions and
bars filing of any further action, usually for a period of thirty to sixty
15. This Comment is not intended to be a survey of conciliation court law in all fifty
states. Statutes mentioned are for illustrative purposes only.
16. In some cases, the conciliation court is a subdivision of a family court. In some
cases, the former court is independent.
17. NEB. REv. STAT. § 42-811 (1988). Other similar provisions include: ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 25-381.08 (1991); CAL. Civ. PROc. CODE § 1760 (West 1982); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 40-3-111(2) (1991); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3117.08(B) (Baldwin 1991
Supp.); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-16.1 (1989).
18. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN § 25-381.20 (1991). Similar provisions include MONT.
CODE ANN. § 40-3-111(3) (1991); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-823 (1988); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3117.08(B) (Baldwin 1991 Supp.). California's law states that the court "shall have
jurisdiction . . . whether or not there is any minor child . . . where [the] controversy
involves domestic violence." CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1760 (West 1982).
19. OHIO REv. CODE AN4N. § 3117.05(A) (Baldwin 1991 Supp). Similar provisions
include: ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-381.09 (1991); CAL. Civ. PRoC. CODE § 1761 (West
1982); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-3-121 (1991); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-812 (1988); N.Y.
FAM. CT. AcT § 921 (McKinney 1985); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-16.2 (1989).
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days.' In some states, even if no spouse files a petition for conciliation,
the court may order a conciliation hearing.' In addition, the court may
recommend or require that the parties see a state-appointed domestic
relations counselor, a specialist, ' or, in some cases, a member of the
clergy.23
These conciliation statutes recognize that divorcing spouses may
need assistance in reaching a settlement. Given the important role that
religion can play in family life, and particularly in divorce,' it is logical
20. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-3-127(1) (1991) which reads: "[diuring a period
beginning upon the filing of the petition for conciliation and continuing until thirty days after
the hearing of the petition for conciliation, neither spouse shall file any action for dissolution,
declaration of invalidity, or separate maintenance." Arizona's law adds that "upon the filing
of a petition for conciliation, proceedings then pending in the superior court shall be stayed."
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-381.18 (1991).
21. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1771 (West 1982), which reads:
Whenever any petition for dissolution of marriage . . . is filed in the
superior court, and it appears to the court at any time during the
pendency of the proceedings that there is any minor child of the
spouses, or either of them, whose welfare may be adversely affected by
the dissolution of the marriage or the disruption of the household or a
controversy involving child custody, and that there appears to be some
reasonable possibility of a reconciliation being effected, the case may be
transferred to the family conciliation court for proceedings for
reconciliation of the spouses or amicable settlement of issues in
controversy in accordance with the provisions of this chapter.
22. Experts could include a marriage counselor, a psychiatrist, or other scientific expert.
(Nebraska even specifies an endocrinologist. NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-819 (1988)).
23. Utah's law reads:
The judge ... may . . . require one or both of [the spouses] to appear
before him and . . . require them to file a petition for conciliation and
to appear before [a state appointed domestic relations] counselor, or
may recommend the aid of a physician, psychiatrist, psychologist,
social service worker or other specialists or scientific expert, or the
pastor, bishop or presiding officer of any religious denomination to
which the parties may belong.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-17 (1989). California's law requires consent of the parties before
referral to a counselor of any kind: "the court may . . . with the consent of both parties to
the proceeding, recommend or invoke the aid . . . ." CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1768 (West
1982). Only Utah allows a judge to order referral to a listed counselor, other states follow
California's consent provisions.
24. The tenets of many religions set forth procedural and substantive requirements for
marriage and divorce. For instance, the Jewish religion has a particular process which the
faithful must follow in order to have a recognized divorce. Upon marriage, the spouses sign
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that the conciliation procedures outlined above would make some
recognition of religion. Ijowever, by specifically providing for
consultation with religious officials, these statutes raise potential First
Amendment problems.
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution states in
pertinent part that "Congress shall make no law respecting the
establishment of religion, nor prohibiting the free exercise thereof .
."' The first clause, or the establishment clause, prohibits the federal
government from making affirmative acts to further or to establish a
religion.' The second clause, or the free exercise clause, prohibits the
government from making laws which interfere with an individual's free
exercise of his or her religion. 2
A state's recognition of the existence of religion or religious
organizations is not necessarily unconstitutional; in fact, the free exercise
clause may even require recognition in some cases.' Nevertheless, in
recognizing religion, the government must be careful not to single out a
particular religion for recognition, and must also insure against endorsing
an agreement, called a Ketubah, which provides, among other things, that the parties will
abide by Jewish law in the event of a divorce. A Jewish couple wishing to have their divorce
recognize4 by the religious body must appear before a religious tribunal, the Beth Din.
Lawrence C. Marshall, Note, The Religion Clauses and Compelled Religious Divorces: A
Study in Marital and Constitutional Separations, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 204, 206-209 (1985).
Whether a court can compel an unwilling spouse to participate in the religious procedures
raises First Amendment issues. While no federal court has passed directly on the issue,
several state courts have required a spouse to participate, using theories of contract law. Id.
at 205 n.7. In one case in particular, the New York Court of Appeals found specific
performance available to one spouse, based upon the Ketubah as contract, allowing the
spouse to compel appearance before the Beth Din. Avitzur v. Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d 136
(N.Y. 1983), cert. denied 464 U.S. 817 (1983). States, including New York, have also
passed statutes requiring divorcing spouses to remove any bar to the other's remarriage.
Marshall, supra at 205.
25. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
26. "Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion.. .. " Id.
27. " . . . or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." Id.
28. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (finding the application of a
state law requiring children to remain in school until age sixteen violative of the free exercise
clause where such schooling conflicted with the tenets of the Amish religion); Sherbert v.
Varner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (finding a free exercise violation in the denial of unemployment
benefits to an individual who refused to work on Saturday, her Sabbath). In both of these
cases, the state is required to treat an individual differently to accommodate the free exercise
of his or her religion.
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religion over non-religion. 2  Requiring a party to consult a member of
the clergy could rise to the level of an establishment. Alternatively, as
discussed below, if the party were unwilling to consult such a religious
official, but were required to do so, the requirement could be viewed as a
burden upon the free exercise of religion. To determine whether the
"religious official" provisions of the conciliation statutes violate either of
the religion clauses of the First Amendment, we must examine the
applicable law.
A. The Establishment Clause
The establishment clause prevents the federal government from
taking action that would serve to favor one religion over another,3" or to
favor religion as a whole over non-religion. 1 Clarifying exactly what
that prohibition means, and defining the standard for determining a
violation of the establishment clause has produced much scholarship and
controversy. One argument holds that the clause requires complete
separation, a "wall", between church and state, which would effectively
prohibit any interaction. As a general rule, the Supreme Court has not
subscribed to this strict separation theory." While strict separation
would have the certainty of a bright line test, the idea is not practical.
Prohibiting all contact between church and state would create an
administrative nightmare, potentially forbidding, for example, firefighters
from responding to a fire at a parochial school. 3 Also, a "no contact"
test would very likely burden the free exercise of religion. If a church,
for example, had no access to government services like fire and police
protection, the church would find continued operation quite difficult.?
29. School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 215 (1961).
30. Eversonv. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1946).
31. Abington Township, 374 U.S. at 215.
32. See, e.g., Everson, 330 U.S. 1; Committee for Public Educ. and Religious Liberty
v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 760 (1973).
33. Everson, 330 U.S. at 17.
34. The interaction between the two clauses creates tension. Because one clause restricts
affirmative establishments and the other clause requires accommodation, the clauses are, at
times, unavoidably in conflict. See, e.g., Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961)
(holding that orthodox Jewish store owners could not be exempted from Sunday closing laws
despite the fact that their religion also required closing on Saturday). In some instances,
what is considered a permissible accommodation by some might be considered a de facto
establishment by others. See, e.g., Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (upholding the
opening of the legislative session with prayers by a chaplain).
In Sherbert v. Varner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), the Court held denial of
unemployment benefits to be unconstitutional where the state based the denial on the
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A second interpretation of the establishment clause proposes that
the clause requires the government to remain neutral to religion. What
neutrality means, however, is also controversial.' Even if one selects a
definition of neutrality, it is not easy to determine whether a particular
government action is neutral. Although debate continues about the
meaning and proper interpretation of the establishment clause,
governments and individuals need a standard by which to judge
government action. In responding to that need, the Supreme Court, in
Lemon v. Kurtzman,"' enunciated a test for determining whether an
establishment clause violation exists.
37
The three part Lemon test requires: (1) that a statute have a
secular legislative purpose, (2) that it not have the principal or primary
effect of advancing religion, and (3) that it not foster an excessive
government entanglement with religion.' Thus, the test as originally
framed includes three steps, or prongs. These steps are commonly
referred to as the purpose, effect, and entanglement prongs. Although the
Court continues to use the three part Lemon test, recent decisions have
individual's refisal to work on Saturday, her religion's Sabbath. Justice Harlan, in dissent,
pointed out that the Court's decision could be viewed an establishment because the individual
is only entitled to the benefit because of her religion. However, Justice Harlan found such
action to be a permissible accommodation, based on the facts of the case. He made the
distinction to emphasize that such action should not always be a required accommodation.
Varner, 374 U.S. at 422 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
In Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985), the Court found an
establishment clause violation where a statue required an employer to exempt an individual
from work on the employee's Sabbath.
See also, Jesse Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment:
Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. PITT. L. REv. 673 (1980).
35. See generally, GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL.., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1455-1510 (2d
ed. 1991). See also, Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems,
47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971); Philip Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1 (1961); Douglas Laycock, A Survey of Religious Liberty in the United States,
47 OHIO ST. L.J. 409 (1986); Gail Merel, The Protection of Individual Choice, A Consistent
Understanding of Religion Under the First Amendment, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 805 (1978);
Mark V. Tushnet, 'Of Church and State and The Supreme Court: Kurland Revisited, 1989
SUP. CT. REV. 373; John D. Valuri, The Concept of Neutrality in Establishment Clause
Doctrine, 48 U. PIT. L. REV. 83 (1986).
36. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
37. Not surprisingly, the test has been the subject of much discussion and criticism. See
infra Parts I.A.1 - Il.A.3.
38. "First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or
primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion . . . [and third] the
statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion.'" Lemon, 403
U.S. at 612-613.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 8:2 1993]
suggested that the Court may modify Lemon. 9 Because the Court has
not expressly abandoned Lemon, and because the Court has not yet
announced a new test,' I will apply the traditional three part Lemon test
to the "religious official" provisions in the conciliation statutes. However,
where appropriate, I will integrate the more recent case law analysis.
1. The "Purpose" Prong
Using the Lemon test, the first inquiry made is whether the statute
has a secular legislative purpose. As is true in other constitutional law
contexts, the Justices on the Supreme Court are divided as to what
constitutes an impermissible motive, and how far the Court should go in
determining motive.41 This disagreement is further confused by the fact
that very few statutes explicitly state an impermissible motive.' Despite,
39. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573
(1989); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987); Witters v. Washington Dep't of
Services for Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986); Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373
(1985); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Lynch V. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984);
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983). For a
good overview of the test and its evolution, see Carl H. Esbeck, The Lemon Test: Should it
be Retained, Reformulated or Rejected?, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 513
(1990). See also infra Parts II.A.1-II.A.3.
40. A case recently before the Supreme Court, Lee v. Wiseman, 112 S. Ct. 2649
(1992), had been expected to be the vehicle the Court used to alter or reject the Lemon test.
Wiseman challenged the middle school principal's invitation of a Rabbi to offer prayers at
graduation. The Court in Lee expressly rejected the "invitation of petitioners ... and amicus
the United States to reconsider our decision in Lemon v. Kurtzman." Lee, 112 S. Ct. at
2655. However, the Court did not actually use the Lemon test to determine the outcome of
the case. Instead, the majority focused on what it termed the mandatory nature of the
graduation ceremony and on the fact that the principal had given the Rabbi a pamphlet of
guidelines for prayer, making the prayer attributable to the state. Justice Scalia, in his
dissent, argued that since the majority did not use the Lemon test, they were, in effect,
invalidating it as a means to measure establishment clause violations. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at
2678 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Clearly, the members of the Court have not yet reached a
consensus upon how to proceed in establishment clause analysis. Nevertheless, since the
Court has not overruled Lemon, that test remains appropriate for the analysis presented in this
Comment.
41. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (Scalia, dissenting). The case
invalidated a Louisiana statute requiring public schools to teach creationism if they taught
evolution. Scalia objected to the Court's purpose analysis. See also, Hal Culbertson,
Religion in the Political Process: A Critique of Lemon's Purpose Test, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV.
915 (1990); Joseph Richard Hurt, The Use of Endorsement in Establishment Clause Analysis,
8 Miss. C. L. REv. 1 (1987).
42. Hidden impermissible motive is one of the primary reasons for the effect prong. If
the primary and principal effect is to advance religion, an illegitimate purpose can often be
inferred.
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or perhaps because of this muddying, statutes are very rarely invalidated
solely on the purpose prong analysis.' Unless a purpose is clearly not
secular, the Court has usually found the purpose prong satisfied.4
The purpose prong has been subject to the criticism of
commentators and Justices alike.' One of the main objections to the
purpose prong is that, unless a statute expressly states an impermissible
purpose, the prong has no function. Often, where a legitimate but
pretextual purpose is stated, the effect prong will uncover the
impermissible purpose. The purpose prong unnecessarily complicates the
analysis. Alternatively, some argue that determining legislative purpose is
an unworkable proposition and that the purpose prong is, therefore,
unnecessary. Despite these criticisms, and despite some movement away
from the purpose prong analysis in recent Court decisions, the analygis has
not been abandoned.
The purpose reflected in the conciliation statutes is the promotion
and protection of family life, and the protection of children's welfare.
The statutes aim to achieve this purpose by effectuating reconciliation or
amicable settlement of a controversy whenever possible.4' Although the
belief that the state should encourage family life has its roots in the tenets
of any one of a number of religions, that belief is not inherently
religious.47 The establishment clause forbids only statutes whose purpose
is to promote religion. In fact, it only forbids statutes whose actual or
main purpose is to promote religion. Where the statute's expressed
43. But see, e.g., Edwards, 482 U.S. 578.
44. A statute will be invalidated only "if it is motivated wholly by an impermissible
purpose" or if the "pre-eminent purpose . . . is plainly religious in nature." Esbeck, supra
note 39, at 515 (quoting Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988) and Stone v. Graham, 449
U.S. 39 (1980), respectively). If promoting religion is some part of the purpose, the statute
will probably still be valid. Id. at 516 (citing Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985)).
45. Justice O'Connor's approach may be merging the purpose and effect prongs into a
single "endorsement" test. See infra Part ll.A.2.
46. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAr. §42-801 (1988) which states:
The purposes of sections 42-801 to 42-823 are to protect the rights of
children and to promote the public welfare by preserving, promoting,
and protecting family life and the institution of matrimony, and to
provide means for the reconciliation of spouses and the amicable
settlement of domestic and family controversies.
47. Esbeck, supra note 39, at 532. Esbeck argues that the Court, in its establishment
clause analysis, distinguishes between laws which directly promote religion (like requiring the
teaching of creationism) and those which, while they may have once been religiously
motivated, have their basis in general morality (like criminal murder statutes). He argues
that the purpose and effect prongs "are materially stiffened or relaxed . . . depending upon
whether the challenged statute is, or is not 'inherently religious.'" Id. at 532.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 8:2 1993]
purpose happens to coincide with a religious belief, there is no violation so
long as that purpose is not solely religious. A common sense example
would be a statute criminalizing murder. One could argue that the
foundation for such a statute is a religious belief that murder is immoral.
Nevertheless, few would argue that the belief is inherently religious - it
has become part of the moral fabric of society in general. Thus an invalid
purpose would only exist if the belief upon which the statute is based is
inherently religious, or if promoting religion were the motivating goal of
the statute.
The "religious official" provisions in the conciliation statutes are
not inherently religious. They do coincide with religious belief, but there
are secular motivations for the provisions as well. A legislature could
well believe that the aim of the statute would not be reached without
providing an avenue for religious counseling for those who wish it. The
cost justifications mentioned at the beginning of this Comment, whether
one agrees with their premise or not, can also be classified as secular
motivations. The Court has not been exacting in requiring a strong secular
inotivation. Since the primary motivation, reconciliation, can be
considered as a secular one, there is little doubt that the "religious official"
provisions would pass the purpose prong of the Lemon test.
2. The Effect Prong
Although a statute may have a permissible purpose, it may still
fail the second prong of the Lemon test. A statute must not have the
principal or primary effect of advancing religion. However, what is a
principal or primary effect? This question makes the effect prong the most
difficult of the three prongs of the Lemon test. Also, this analysis has
undergone the most modification.' To understand what constitutes a
principal or primary effect, it is helpful to examine what does not qualify
as such an effect.
If a statute has only the incidental effect of advancing religion, the
effect prong is not violated.49 The Court has found the effect to be only
incidental where a city included a creche (nativity scene) in a larger
48. See supra note 39. See also, Arnold H. Loewy, Rethinking Government Neutrality
Towards Religion Under the Establishment Clause: The Untapped Potential of Justice
O'Connor's Insight, 64 N.C. L. REV. 1049 (1986); Gary J. Simson, The Establishment
Clause in the Supreme Court: Rethinking the Court's Approach, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 905
(1987).
49. Bowenv. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
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holiday display;"° where a state allowed a tax deduction for tuition,
textbooks, and transportation for parents of all primary and secondary
students;' and where a statute allowed funding to religious organizations
(among others) to counsel teenagers."
It may be that the principal or primary effect of advancing
religion will only occur if the government gives a benefit directly to a
"pervasively sectarian" institution.' The Court, narrowing the reach of
the effect prong, has said that such an institution would be one "in which
religion is so pervasive that a substantial portion of its functions are
subsumed in the religious mission." s' In addition to narrowing the
definition of institutions whose actions are expected inherently to promote
religion, the Court also has focused recently on state versus individual
control.s' Where the direction of the funds is controlled by individual
choice, and not by government fiat or encouragement, there is not the
principal or primary effect of advancing religion. This analysis holds true
even if the aid eventually flows to a religious organization and even if the
aid may actually promote religion in some incidental way.
50. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984). The Court found that the context, i.e. the
inclusion of a santa, reindeer, and a seasons greetings banner, diffused the religious message
of the creche.
51. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983). The Court found that by allowing all
parents the deduction, the statute placed the choice of schools in the parents' hands. A
parent could choose to send a child to a religious school or not, the state did not encourage
or discourage either choice. Aid did not flow directly to the religious institution from the
state, but would do so only as a result of the individual choices of the parents.
52. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 605-15. The Court indicated that there was nothing "inherently
religious" about the counseling services, even though the approach "may coincide with the
approach taken by certain religions." Id. at 607. Additionally, the Court found it "quite
sensible for Congress to recognize that religious organizations can influence values and can
have some influence on family life." The Court further stated that "[t]o the extent that this
congressional recognition has any effect of advancing religion, the effect is at most
'incidental and remote.'" Id.
53. Esbeck, supra note 39, at 522-25.
54. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 610 (quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973)):
55. See supra note 51. See also Witters v. Washington Dep't of Social Services for
Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986) (holding that a statute authorizing payment to a handicapped
individual for vocational rehabilitation services did not violate the establishment clause where
the individual planned to use the funds to train as a minister. The Court focused on the
individual choice of how the funds would be used, finding that the statute did not encourage
sectarian education.); Esbeck, supra note 39, at 525-527, arguing for the emergence of a
"facial-neutrality, private choice" analysis. Esbeck argues that where a statute simply allows
some benefit to an individual who is advancing an "independently chosen religious
objective," the Court will not find a violation. He argues further that this analysis is an
"adjustment to modernity," and that to exclude such choices would be hostile to religion,
potentially creating a free exercise problem. Id.
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Another important modification of the effect prong is Justice
O'Connor's endorsement analysis.56  O'Connor asks whether the
government action has the "effect of communicating a message of
endorsement or disapproval of religion."' It is not entirely clear
whether O'Connor's endorsement test will prevail, nor is it clear exactly
what effect it will have on the Lemon test. However, it is important to
analyze the conciliation statutes under all of the above variations of the
effect prong.
Two points are important to note at the outset. First, the
"religious official" provisions of the conciliation statutes are not funding
provisions and therefore are not directly analogous to similar cases cited
above.' Second, except for Utah, the statutes require consent of the
parties before referral to a counselor is permitted. s9
In Bowen v. Kendrick, the Court upheld a statute that allowed
grants to religious institutions for counseling services under the Adolescent
Family Life Act (AFLA).' In Bowen, the issue was the funding of the
counseling. Counseling teenagers regarding pre-marital sexual relations
and teen pregnancy was the aim of the AFLA at issue in Bowen. The
statute also placed prohibitions on certain activities, for example, the
giving of information promoting abortion as an option. These prohibitions
tracked clearly the tenets of some religions. The Court held that the effect
of advancing religion was "at most incidental and remote," finding
reasonable Congress' recognition of the influence of religious
organizations on family life.6" Although funding is not an issue with the
conciliation statutes, the effect prong analysis should proceed in the same
manner as in Bowen.
The "religious official" provisions of the conciliation statutes also
involve counseling. This counseling is likely to coincide with the tenets of
whatever religion the counselor represents. Following the Court's
reasoning in Bowen, however, such counseling would similarly have only
the incidental effect of advancing religion since, arguably, the purpose is
56. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (O'Connor, ., concurring);
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
57. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692.
58. In fact, most expressly prohibit the use of state funds. For example, Montana's law
states: "[s]uch aid, however, shall not be at the expense of the court or the county, unless
the county commissioners of the county specifically provide and authorize such aid." MONT.
CODE ANN. § 40-3-125 (1991).
59. See the Utah statute, supra note 23.
60. The Court upheld the statute on its face, but remanded for a determination of its
constitutionality "as applied." Bowen, 487 U.S. at 622.
61. Id. at 607.
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still the secular one, and any advancement of religion is only a by-product
of reaching the secular goal. Also, the fact that consent is required before
referral is allowed would follow the individual choices rationale espoused
by Justice Rehnquist in Mueller v. Allen.' Even where the court can
order a couple to see a counselor,' it is unlikely that the Court would
view the provision as having the principal and primary effect of advancing
religion, since even if the parties are compelled to receive counselling,
they are in no way compelled to accept any proposals made by the
counselor. The statutes require only that the parties attempt reconciliation.
Any reconciliation is arguably of the parties' free will. Further, if
prohibiting counselors who receive AFLA funds from discussing abortion
is not a violation, it is difficult to see how allowing religious officials to
perform marriage counseling would be otherwise, even if it were
compelled."
Even using Justice O'Connor's endorsement analysis, it is difficult
to see how the religious official provisions would fail the effects test.
Although it may be a stretch, one can analogize to Lynch v. Donnelly.'
In Lynch, the Court found the presence of an undeniably religious symbol,
a nativity scene, acceptable based on the context and the total message.
The nativity scene was amongst other "secular" symbols, such as a Santa
and reindeer. Here, a religious official is but one of a number of
alternative counselors listed in the statute. One could argue that any
endorsement is lost where the religious official is grouped with many other
types of counselors, and that the inclusion of a religious official is a
permissible accommodation.
Although it is certainly plausible to argue that by including a
religious official amongst the counseling choices, and providing the
conciliation forum to such an official, the state is promoting religion, it
appears that such an argument would fail with today's Court. Given the
reasoning in cases like Mueller, Bowen and Lynch, it is likely 1hat
whatever effect might occur, it would be considered incidental.
62. 463 U.S. 388 (1983). See supra note 51.
63. Such an order is only possible in Utah.
64. It might, however, raise a free exercise problem. See discussion infra Part ll.B. In
addition, it is possible that a judge's recommendation to see the counselor might carry
significant authority and might be sufficiently influential to be considered coercive.
Seidelson, supra note 1, at 62. Carrying that argument further, the pressure to undertake
conciliation might be interpreted as pressure to settle the controversy.
65. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
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3. The Entanglement Prong
The final prong of the Lemon test requires that the statute in
question not foster an excessive entanglement with religion. In the past,
entanglement has been subdivided into two categories, political and
administrative.
Political entanglement exists when a statute causes political
divisiveness along religious lines. This divisiveness does not mean
ordinary and valuable disagreement, but instead means causing a candidate
to expressly align with a religious group, or forcing voters to vote based
upon religious considerations. With the Court and many commentators
questioning whether a political divisiveness inquiry might impinge upon
the speech protections of the First Amendment, the Court has not recently
focused on this category in its analysis.'
Administrative entanglement exists where a statute requires the
government to become enmeshed in a religious institution's affairs, or
allows a religious organization a place in government decisions. The
prohibition of administrative entanglement embodied in the entanglement
prong is intended to protect both the church and the state.
In Aguilar v. Felton, the Court struck down a statute that
provided funds and services to parochial students in their schools.' The
Court found that the supervision which was necessary to prevent use of the
program to inculcate religious beliefs "inevitably result[ed] in . . .
excessive entanglement."' However, in Bowen, the Court found no
excessive entanglement in the monitoring of grants." The Court saw "no
reason to fear" undue government intrusion on the day-to-day activities of
the religious organizations. 71
An analysis of the conciliation statutes suggests the same
conclusion. No funding is required, and the court performs no direct
supervision of the counseling. The "religious official" provisions are more
like those at issue in Bowen than those in Aguilar, The conciliation court
would not be involved in the counseling in any more of an intrusive
manner than the government would have been with the AFLA counselors.
Further, the lack of direct funding makes the relationship even more
distant. Although it is possible to argue that government supervision
would be necessary to prevent the use of counseling to inculcate religious
66. Esbeck, supra note 39, at 528-29.
67. 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
68. Id.
69. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 616.
70. Id.
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beliefs, it is likely that the Court would find less risk of inculcation with
adults in marital counseling than with school age children.
The other potential entanglement risk is the risk that the church
may become entangled in government affairs. It is possible that any
agreement of the parties may be reduced to writing,' although no such
action is required by the statutes. But, if the agreement were reduced to
writing and submitted to the court, one question which might arise is
whether the religious official is intruding on the province of the
judiciary.'2 This argument is plausible, but could be rebutted using the
individual choice argument from Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Mueller.'
The Mueller argument can be used to analyze potential church usurpation
of the state's role in the same way Justice Rehnquist used it in Mueller
itself. So long as any agreement resulting from the marital counseling by
a "religious official" is considered the product of the parties' free choice,
it is hard to see how the church could be any more entangled in
government affairs than the government was entangled in church affairs in
Mueller.
4
Thus, despite the potential establishment clause problem, as the
discussion above indicates, the "religious official" provisions of the
conciliation statutes should pass muster under the Lemon test, including
any modification from recent case law. However, one other potential
problem exists, conflict with the free exercise clause.
B. The Free Exercise Clause
The free exercise clause prohibits the government from interfering
with an individual's free exercise of his or her religion. Generally, the
government must not enact laws that force an individual to choose between
adhering to the tenets of his or her religion and obeying the law. 5
Exactly what government action will rise to the level of an unconstitutional
violation depends to a large extent upon the government's interest and the
71. Nebraska's law reads as follows: "[any reconciliation agreement between the
parties may be reduced to writing and, with the consent of the parties, a court order may be
made requiring the parties to comply therewith." NEB. REv. STAT. § 42-820(1) (1988).
72. The Iowa Supreme Court has determined that an opinion by a clergy member
functioning as a conciliator did not usurp the judicial function. In Re Marriage of Boyd, 200
N.W.2d 845 (1972). A court could view the clergy member as acting upon the wishes of the
couple and not acting to advance a religious belief.
73. See supra notes 51, 62, and 63 and text accompanying.
74. Again, however, one could make the same authority figure argument about the
religious official as was made about the judge, supra note 64. See also supra note 72.
75. Sherbert v. Varner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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exact nature of the choice required by the statute. The free exercise of
religion must be burdened before a violation can exist. Once a burden
exists, the Court has required a compelling state interest and a close nexus
between the means and ends to allow the state to take action which may
infringe upon an individual's right.76 However, more recent decisions
indicate the possibility that the Court may be lowering the level of
scrutiny. 77
In the seminal case of Sherbert v. Varner, the Court found a free
exercise violation where the state forced the individual to "choose between
following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one
hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept
work, on the other hand."' This language delineates an essential
element of the free exercise analysis; there must be a burden on the free
exercise of religion.
However, the Court recently narrowed the burden determination.
In Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association,79 the Court
found no burden on free exercise where the government planned to build a
logging road through the historical sacred areas of the Indians. Justice
O'Connor explained that the free exercise clause is intended to protect
individuals from forced violation of religious beliefs. The clause does not
prohibit "incidental effects . . . which may make it more difficult to
practice certain religions but which have no tendency to coerce."' What
this decision may mean is that only a statute which requires a direct choice
between breaking a law or breaking a religious tenet will create a free
exercise burden.
If a challenger can establish a burden, then the next issue, that
arises is what interest the government can show. Until the Court's recent
decision in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v.
Smith,' the government has been required to show a compelling
interest.' In Smith, Justice Scalia used what is essentially a rational
basis test to uphold a denial of unemployment benefits based on a violation
76. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205 (1972).
77. Employment Division, Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
There, the majority opinion, written by Justice Scalia, did not use the compelling interest
test.
78. Sherbet, 374 U.S. at 404. See also supra note 28 and accompanying text.
79. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
80. Id. at 450-451.
81. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
82. See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986); United States v. Lee, 455
U.S. 252 (1982); Sherbert v. Varner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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of a state criminal law.' It is not clear whether this case is an
aberration, a dramatic change in analysis, or might be distinguishable on
its facts. It is also worth noting that Justice O'Connor would have reached
the same result using the compelling interest test.
In analyzing the "religious official" provisions of the statutes, one
major clarification is relevant. Those statutes that require consent before
referral simply pose no free exercise problem. There is no burden of any
kind if the action is not required and nothing is withheld as a result of not
choosing to see a religious official.' In the case of a statute like the
Utah statute, however, a free exercise problem might arise. 6
The first question to ask in analyzing the statute is whether any
burden is placed on the free exercise of religion. In a case where one
spouse wants conciliation and the other does not, or where a judge orders
both to submit to conciliation, obviously the counseling is compelled.
Given Lyng, however, it is difficult to see how compelling counseling
would create a burden. A spouse is not forced to choose between exercise
of her religion and adherence to the law. Even where someone is not
religious, the counselor is purportedly serving a counseling function little
different from a secular counselor.' Nothing in the compelled
counseling requires that an individual agree to accept or renounce any
beliefs, and once it is determined that reconciliation will not occur, the
divorce action again becomes available to that individual.
Assuming, however, that there is a burden, and further, that the
compelling interest test applies, is the "religious official" provision
allowable? It could be argued that a less burdensome means for achieving
the statutes' purpose would be to restrict the list to secular counselors. If
the list is not so restricted, the inference is that the *interest is not
83. Smith, a counselor at a drug rehabilitation clinic was fired from his job for ingesting
Peyote, a controlled substance. Peyote is part of the religious ritual of the Native American
Church, of which Smith was a member. Smith used Peyote solely as part of a religious
ritual. The Court held that denial of job benefits based on the violation of a criminal law of
general applicability did not violate the free exercise clause.
84. Smith, 494 U.S. at 891 (O'Connor, J.,concurring).
85. Although see supra notes 64 and 74.
86. It is interesting to note that an original Washington statute did not allow the judge to
order consultation because of First Amendment concerns. The statute was later amended to
allow the judge to compel counseling. Luvern V. Rieke, The Dissolution Act of 1973: From
Status to Contract?, 49 WASH. L. REV. 375, 384 (1974). The Washington statute was
repealed in 1991.
87. The reverse argument could be made regarding a very religious individual sent to a
psychiatrist instead of a religious official. It is doubtful that the Court would find a free
exercise violation since it has said that the state is not compelled to take affirmative action to
help an individual exercise his or her religion.
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compelling since it could be achieved in other less burdensome ways.
However, even prior to Smith, the Court has been reluctant to find a
failure of the compelling interest where the legislature asserts one28 In
this case, it is possible that the legislature could show that because of the
presence of religion in family life, a full achievement of purpose would
not be possible without providing the choice of a religious official as a
counselor. Such an argument should fulfill a compelling interest analysis
and override the burden on free exercise. Consequently, the statute would
pass constitutional scrutiny. Under Smith, all that would be necessary is a
rational basis for the provision, clearly present in the legislatures' avowed
purpose and the religious nature of our society.
Again, despite the potential for a free exercise clause violation, it
is unlikely that conciliation statutes would be deemed unconstitutional
under even traditional free exercise analysis. Under the arguably more
relaxed standards of recent decisions, there is little likelihood that
conciliation statutes would be declared unconstitutional.
III. CONCLUSION
As I have discussed, the religion clauses of the First Amendment
present a potential problem for divorce conciliation statutes in several
states. An examination of the establishment, clause and free exercise
clause analysis, particularly in light of recent case law, shows that
"religious official" provisions are constitutional. This result is important
in fashioning further ADR statutes in family law, as well as in other areas
of the law.
Despite the apparent ease with which these provisions passed the
First Amendment analysis, it is important to be aware of the demands of
this and other provisions of the Constitution when establishing ADR
statutes. Becoming embroiled in a legal dispute over the constitutionality
of the ADR statute would be a great disservice and a great irony.
Lisa A. Wright
88. E.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982); Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S.
599 (1961).
